Abstract-There has been a proliferation of public Wi-Fi hotspots that serve a significant amount of global mobile traffic today. In this paper, we propose a general Wi-Fi monetization model for public Wi-Fi hotspots deployed by venue owners (VOs), who generate revenue from providing both the premium Wi-Fi access and the advertising sponsored Wi-Fi access to mobile users (MUs). With the premium access, MUs directly pay VOs for their Wi-Fi usage; while with the advertising sponsored access, MUs watch advertisements in exchange of the free usage of WiFi. VOs sell their ad spaces to advertisers (ADs) via an ad platform, and share a proportion of the revenue with the ad platform. We formulate the economic interactions among the ad platform, VOs, MUs, and ADs as a three-stage Stackelberg game. We characterize the game equilibrium, and show that the ad platform's advertising revenue sharing policy will affect the VOs' Wi-Fi prices but not the VOs' advertising prices. Moreover, we investigate the impacts of the MU visiting frequency and the advertising concentration level on the equilibrium. Our analysis indicates that both the VOs' Wi-Fi prices and advertising prices are non-decreasing in the advertising concentration level and nonincreasing in the MU visiting frequency. Numerical results show that the VOs are capable of generating large revenues through mainly providing one type of Wi-Fi access (the premium access or advertising sponsored access), depending on their advertising concentration levels and MU visiting frequencies.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivations
Global mobile traffic grows unprecedentedly, and is expected to reach 30.6 exabytes per month by 2020 [1] . Facilitated by the recent technology development, data offloading has become one of the main approaches to accommodate the mobile traffic explosion. According to the forecast of Cisco, 55% of the global mobile traffic will be offloaded to Wi-Fi and small cell networks by 2020 [1] .
According to the report of Wireless Broadband Alliance [2] , 50% of worldwide commercial Wi-Fi hotspots are owned by different venues, such as cafes, restaurants, hotels, and airports. 1 The venue owners (VOs) build public Wi-Fi for the access of mobile users (MUs), in order to enhance MUs' experiences and meanwhile provide location-based services (e.g., shopping guides, navigation, billing) to benefit the VOs' own business [3] .
To compensate for the Wi-Fi deployment and operational costs, VOs have been actively considering monetizing their hotspots. One conventional business model is that VOs directly charge MUs for their Wi-Fi usage. However, as most MUs prefer free Wi-Fi access, it is suggested that VOs should come up with new business models to create extra revenue streams [2] . Wi-Fi advertising, where VOs obtain revenue from advertisers (ADs) by broadcasting ADs' advertisements on their hotspots, has emerged as a promising monetization approach. It is especially attractive to ADs, as the accurate localization of Wi-Fi allows ADs to make location-aware advertising. Furthermore, with MUs' basic information collected by the hotspots, 2 ADs can efficiently find their targeted customers and deliver the personalized contents to them.
Nowadays, several companies, including SOCIFI (collaborated with Cisco) [4] and Boingo [5] , are providing the following types of technical supports for VOs and ADs on WiFi advertising. First, they offer the devices and softwares which enable VOs to display selected advertisements on the Wi-Fi login pages and collect the statistics information (e.g., number of visitors and click-through rates). Second, they manage the ad platforms, where VOs and ADs trade the ad spaces. Once ADs purchase the ad spaces, VOs and ad platforms share ADs' payment based on the sharing policy designed by ad platforms. Although Wi-Fi advertising has been emerging in practice, its influence on entities like VOs and MUs, as well as the detailed pricing and revenue sharing policies, has not been carefully studied in the existing literatures. This motivates our study in this work.
B. Contributions
We consider a general Wi-Fi monetization model, where VOs monetize their hotspots by providing two types of WiFi access: premium access and advertising sponsored access. With the premium access, MUs pay VOs according to certain pricing schemes. With the advertising sponsored access, MUs are required to watch the advertisements, after which MUs use Wi-Fi for free during a certain period. 3 Depending on the VOs' pricing schemes, MUs with different valuations on Wi-Fi access will choose different types of access. When MUs choose the advertising sponsored access, VOs sell the corresponding ad spaces to ADs through participating in the ad platform. Based on the ad platform's sharing policy, VOs share a proportion (denoted by δ) of the ADs' payment with the ad platform. Fig. 1 illustrates the Wi-Fi monetization ecosystem. In this work, we will study such a Wi-Fi monetization system in two parts.
1) Modeling and Equilibrium Characterization:
In the first part of our work, we model the economic interactions among different decision makers as a three-stage Stackelberg game, and study the game equilibrium systematically. Specifically, in Stage I, the ad platform designs an advertising revenue sharing policy for each VO, which indicates the fraction of advertising revenue that a VO needs to share with the ad platform. In Stage II, each VO decides and announces its Wi-Fi price to MUs for the premium access, and its advertising price to ADs. In Stage III, MUs choose the access types (premium or advertising sponsored access), and ADs decide the number of ad spaces to purchase from the VO.
We analyze the equilibrium of the proposed Stackelberg game systematically. Our analysis shows that: (a) the VO's advertising price (to ADs) in Stage II is independent of the ad platform's advertising revenue sharing policy in Stage I, as a VO always charges the advertising price to maximize the total advertising revenue; (b) the VO's Wi-Fi price (to MUs) in Stage II is set based on the ad platform's sharing policy in Stage I, since a VO will increase the Wi-Fi price to push more MUs to the advertising sponsored access if the VO can keep more advertising revenue.
2) Sensitivity Analysis: In the second part of our work, we define an equilibrium indicator, the value of which determines the equilibrium outcomes, such as the ad platform's sharing policy and the VO's Wi-Fi price. Intuitively, the equilibrium indicator describes the VO's relative benefit in providing the premium access over the advertising sponsored access. We show that when the equilibrium indicator is small, the VO charges the highest Wi-Fi price to push all MUs to the advertising sponsored access. On the other hand, when the equilibrium is large, the ad platform sets the highest advertising revenue sharing ratio, and the VO mainly generates its revenue from the premium access.
Furthermore, we investigate the influences of (a) the advertising concentration level, which measures the degree of asymmetry in ADs' popularity, and (b) the visiting frequency, which reflects the average time that MUs visit the venue. Our analysis shows that these two parameters have the opposite impacts on a VO's pricing strategies: (a) both the VO's WiFi price and advertising price are non-decreasing when the popularity among ADs becomes more asymmetric, and (b) both prices are non-increasing when MUs visit the VO more often.
The key contributions of this work are as follows:
• Novel Wi-Fi Monetization Model: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work studying the advertising sponsored public Wi-Fi hotspots. We consider a general Wi-Fi monetization model with both the premium access and the advertising sponsored access, which enable a VO to segment the market based on MUs' valuations, and maximize the VO's revenue. 
C. Related Work
Several recent works have studied the business models related to Wi-Fi networks. Duan et al. in [6] and Musacchio et al. in [7] studied the pricing schemes of Wi-Fi owners. Yu et al. in [8] analyzed the optimal strategies for network operators and VOs to deploy public Wi-Fi networks cooperatively. Gao et al. in [9] and Iosifidis et al. in [10] investigated the WiFi capacity trading problem, where cellular network operators lease third-party Wi-Fi to offload their traffic. Manshaei et al. in [11] and Afrasiabi et al. in [12] analyzed the problem where Wi-Fi owners collaborate and share Wi-Fi access points. Different from these works, we study the monetization of public Wi-Fi through the Wi-Fi advertising, and focus on the economic interactions among different entities in the entire Wi-Fi ecosystem.
A closely related work on Wi-Fi advertising is [13] , where Bergemann et al. considered an advertising market with ADs having different market shares. The differences between [13] and our work are as follows. First, in [13] , an MU is only interested in one AD's product, while in our model, an MU can be interested in multiple ADs' products. Second, in [13] , the authors analyzed the market with an infinite number of ADs, while in our work, we first analyze the problem with a finite number of ADs, and then consider the limiting asymptotic case with an infinite number of ADs. Moreover, in [14] , [15] , the authors explored the influence of targeting on the advertising market. However, none of the works [13] - [15] considered the ad platform and the associated advertising revenue sharing, which is a key focus of our study.
II. SYSTEM MODEL In this section, we define the strategies of four types of decision makers in the Wi-Fi monetization ecosystem: the ad platform, VOs, ADs, and MUs. We formulate their interactions as a three-stage Stackelberg game.
A. Ad Platform
The ad platform plays two major roles in the ecosystem. First, it offers the platform for VOs to locate ADs and sell their ad spaces to ADs. Second, it offers the necessary technical supports for VOs to display advertisements on their Wi-Fi hotspots. 4 To compensate for its operational cost, the ad platform will share a fraction of the VOs' revenue collected from selling ad spaces to ADs.
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Revenue Sharing Ratio δ: We first consider the VOspecific revenue sharing case, where the ad platform can set different advertising revenue sharing ratios for different VOs. In this case, we can focus on the interaction between the ad platform and a particular VO without loss of generality, as different VOs are decoupled. Let δ denote the ad platform's revenue sharing policy for the VO, which corresponds to the fraction of the advertising revenue that the VO needs to transfer to the ad platform. When the ad platform takes away all the advertising revenue (i.e., δ = 1), the VO will not be interested in providing the advertising sponsored access, and the ad platform cannot obtain any revenue. Hence, we assume that the ad platform can only choose δ from interval [0, 1 − ], where is a parameter that is close to zero. Mathematically, all results in this paper hold for any ∈ 0, 1 3 . The corresponding analysis for this VO-specific revenue sharing case is given in Sections II to VII.
In Section VIII, we will further discuss the uniform revenue sharing case, where the ad platform sets a uniform δ U ∈ [0, 1 − ] for all VOs due to the fairness consideration.
B. VO's Pricing Decision
The VO provides two types of Wi-Fi access for MUs: the premium access and the advertising sponsored access.
Wi-Fi Price p f : We assume that the VO charges the premium access based on a time segment structure: Each time segment has a fixed length, and the VO charges p f per time segment. Fig. 2 illustrates such an example, where the length of one time segment is 30 minutes. If an MU chooses the premium access for two segments, it pays 2p f , and can use the Wi-Fi for 60 minutes. 4 For example, SOCIFI Media Network is the ad platform managed by SOCIFI [4] . SOCIFI Media Network collects visitors' data, provides the statistics, such as the click-through rates, and supports the ad display in different formats (e.g., website, video, message). 5 As stated in [4], there is no cost for VOs to register SOCIFI Media Network, which earns profits from sharing its revenue with VOs. Advertising Price p a : The MU can also use the Wi-Fi for free by choosing the advertising sponsored access. In this case, the MU has to watch an advertisement at the beginning of each time segment. To guarantee the fairness among the MUs who choose the advertising sponsored access, we assume that all advertisements have the same displaying time. Let p a denote the advertising price for ADs (for showing one advertisement). In the example of Fig. 2 , the ad display time is 1 minute. If an MU chooses the advertising sponsored access for two segments, it needs to watch 2 minutes of advertisements in total, and can use the Wi-Fi for the remaining 58 minutes free of charge. Meanwhile, the VO can obtain a revenue 2p a from ADs.
C. MUs' Access Choices
MU's Payoff and Decision: We consider the operations in a fixed relatively long time period (e.g., one week). 6 Let N > 0 denote the number of MUs visiting the VO during the period. We use θ ∈ [0, θ max ] (θ max > 0) to describe a particular MU's valuation on the Wi-Fi connection. We assume that θ follows the uniform distribution. 7 Let d ∈ {0, 1} denote an MU's access choice, with d = 0 denoting the advertising sponsored access, and d = 1 denoting the premium access. We normalize the length of each segment to 1, and define the payoff of a type-θ MU in one time segment as
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the utility reduction factor, and term 1 − β describes the discount of the MU's utility due to the inconvenience of watching advertisements. 8 For simplicity, we assume that β is user-independent. When d = 0, the MU's equivalent Wi-Fi usage time during each time segment is 1−β; when d = 1, the MU pays p f to use the Wi-Fi during the whole segment.
Each MU will choose an access type that maximizes its payoff. Let ϕ f (p f ) , ϕ a (p f ) ∈ [0, 1] denote the fractions of MUs choosing the premium access and the advertising sponsored access under price p f , respectively.
MU Visiting Frequency λ: We further assume that the number of time segments that an MU demands at the venue 6 The time length of the period is chosen such that all the system parameters introduced in this paper can be well approximated by constants. 7 The uniform distribution has been widely used to model MUs' valuations on the wireless service [6] , [16] . The consideration of other distributions does not change the main conclusions in this paper. 8 In Fig. 2 . within the considered period (say one week) is a random variable k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, and follows the Poisson distribution with parameter λ > 0. 9 We assume that all MUs visiting the venue have a homogenous parameter λ. Since λ = E {k}, λ reflects MU visiting frequency at the venue, and a larger λ implies that MUs visit the venue more often.
Since the current Wi-Fi technology already achieves a large throughput, we assume that the capacity of the VO's Wi-Fi is not a bottleneck and can be considered as unlimited. 10 
D. ADs' Advertising Model
There are M ADs who seek to display advertisements at the venue. We assume that MUs have intrinsic interests on different ADs' products. An MU will purchase a particular AD's product, if and only if it is interested in that AD's product, and has seen the AD's advertisement at least once. This assumption reflects the complementary perspective of advertising [18] , and has been widely used in the advertising literature [13] - [15] . Intuitively, this assumption means that the advertising does not change the consumers' preferences, but becomes a necessary condition to generate a purchase.
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AD's Popularity σ: We define the popularity of an AD as the percentage of MUs who are interested in the AD's product. Each AD's popularity at the venue is described by its type σ, which is uniformly distributed in [0, σ max ]. We assume the popularity of a type-σ AD is
where γ ∈ (0, 1] is a system parameter. 12 We can show that s (σ) is decreasing in the type index σ and s (σ) ≤ 1. The parameter γ measures the advertising concentration level at the venue, which is defined as the asymmetry of the popularities of ADs with different type σ. A large γ implies a high advertising concentration level, since those ADs with small values of σ have much higher popularities than other ADs.
In Fig. 3 , we show different types of ADs' popularities at an electronics store and a cafe, respectively. Since the electronics store is more specialized and most visitors have interests on 9 Poisson distribution has been widely used to model the distribution of the number of events that occur within a time period [17] . It is a good initial approximation before we get more measurement data that allow us to build a more elaborated model of user behaviors. 10 A similar assumption on the unlimited Wi-Fi capacity has been made in reference [6] . Next we briefly discuss the problem with a limited WiFi capacity. First, if the capacity is limited but MUs who choose d = 0 and d = 1 experience the same congestion level, then essentially it will not change our analysis. Second, if MUs with d = 0 and d = 1 experience different congestion levels but the difference in the congestion level is a constant, then the congestion difference can be easily factorized in our model, and also does not change the results. Third, if MUs with d = 0 and d = 1 experience different congestion levels and the difference is not a constant, the analysis will be more complicated, and we plan to investigate this in our future work. 11 Besides the complementary perspective, reference [18] also mentioned the persuasive perspective, where the advertising alters consumers' preferences. We will study the persuasive perspective in our future work. 12 Reference [13] used a similar exponential function to model the market share of a particular AD. However, reference [13] considered a model with an infinite number of ADs, and directly made assumptions on an AD's market share. In our work, we model a finite number of ADs, and use a randomly distributed parameter σ to describe an AD's popularity. In Section IV, we first analyze the VO's optimal pricing for a finite number of ADs, and then focus on the limiting asymptotic case with an infinite number of ADs. Therefore, compared with [13] , our model and analysis are different and more reasonable. the electronics products, the phone AD and computer AD are much more popular than other types of ADs. Hence, the concentration level γ of the electronics store is high. On the contrary, the cafe is less specialized and has a lower concentration level than the electronics store. Advertisement Display: Next we introduce the advertisement displaying setting. Recall that the number of time segments demanded by an MU is Poisson distributed with an average of λ (segments/MU), and the proportion of MUs choosing the advertising sponsored access is ϕ a (p f ). Hence, the expected number of ad spaces that the VO has during the entire time period is λN ϕ a (p f ). Let m be the number of advertisements that an AD decides to display at the venue during the entire time period. If an MU chooses the advertising sponsored access, then the VO shows an advertisement from this particular AD to the MU with the following probability at the beginning of every time segment:
AD's Payoff: Next we study a type-σ AD's payoff. For an MU choosing the advertising sponsored access, the probability that it demands k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} time segments is e −λ λ k k! , and the probability that it does not see the AD's advertisement during these k time segments is 1 − m λN ϕa(p f ) k . Therefore, considering all possibilities of k, the probability for this MU to see the AD's advertisement at least once is
Based on the Maclaurin expansion of the exponential function, the probability above equals
which is an increasing and concave function of m.
Recall that an MU will purchase the AD's product, if and only if the MU is interested in the AD's product and has seen the AD's advertisement at least once. We use Π AD (σ, m) to 13 As shown in the later analysis, the VO will set pa large enough so that the total number of displayed advertisements does not exceed λN ϕa p f . Hence, the summation of (3) over all ADs will not be greater than 1. denote a type-σ AD's payoff (i.e., revenue minus payment):
The parameter a > 0 is the profit that an AD generates when an MU purchases its product, 14 N ϕ a (p f ) is the expected number of MUs choosing the advertising sponsored access, s (σ) is the type-σ AD's popularity, and p a is the VO's advertising price.
E. Three-Stage Stackelberg Game
We formulate the interactions among the ad platform, the VO, MUs, and ADs by a three-stage Stackelberg game, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . From Section III to Section V, we analyze the three-stage game by backward induction.
III. STAGE III: MUS' ACCESS AND ADS' ADVERTISING
In this section, we analyze MUs' optimal access strategies and ADs' optimal advertising strategies in Stage III, given the ad platform's revenue sharing policy δ in Stage I, and the VO's pricing decisions p f and p a in Stage II.
A. MUs' Optimal Access
Equation (1) characterizes an MU's payoff for one time segment. Since an MU's payoff for multiple time segments is simply the summation of its payoff from each time segment, an MU's access choice only depends on its type θ and is independent of the number of time segments it demands. Equation (1) suggests that a type-θ MU will choose d = 1 if θ − p f ≥ θ (1 − β), and d = 0 otherwise. Therefore, the optimal access choice of a type-θ MU is
where θ T (p f ) min p f β , θ max is the threshold user type. Intuitively, MUs with high valuations on the Wi-Fi connection will pay for the premium access and use the Wi-Fi for the whole time segment, while MUs with low valuations will watch advertisements in order to access Wi-Fi for free.
Since θ follows the uniform distribution, under a price p f , the fractions of MUs choosing different types of access are
14 Since our work focuses on studying the heterogeneity of ADs' popularities, we assume a is homogeneous for all ADs at the venue.
B. ADs' Optimal Advertising
According to (6) , a type-σ AD's optimal advertising problem is as follows. Problem 1. The type-σ AD determines the optimal number of ad displays that maximizes its payoff in (6) :
where s (σ) is the type-σ AD's popularity defined in (2).
The type-σ AD's optimal advertising strategy solving Problem 1 is:
Here, σ T (p a ) is the threshold AD type, indicating whether an AD places advertisements. It is defined as
We can show that m * (σ, p a , p f ) is non-increasing in the AD's type σ. The reason is that an AD's popularity s (σ) decreases with its type σ. Only for ADs with high popularities, the benefit of advertising can compensate for the cost of purchasing ad spaces from the VO.
Moreover, m * (σ, p a , p f ) increases with the number of MUs choosing the advertising sponsored access, N ϕ a (p f ). It is somewhat counter-intuitive to notice that the threshold σ T (p a ) is independent of N ϕ a (p f ). When N ϕ a (p f ) increases, the number of MUs that both choose the advertising sponsored access and like the product from an AD with type σ = σ T (p a ) indeed increases. While expression (5) implies that since there are more MUs, the probability for an MU to see the advertisements from the AD with type σ = σ T (p a ) decreases. As a result, the change of N ϕ a (p f ) does not affect the number of ADs who choose to display advertisements at the venue.
IV. STAGE II: VO'S WI-FI AND ADVERTISING PRICING
In this section, we study the VO's advertising pricing p a and Wi-Fi pricing p f in Stage II, under a fixed ad platform's revenue sharing policy δ in Stage I, and considering the MUs' and ADs' strategies in Stage III.
A. VO's Optimal Advertising Price
We first fix the VO's Wi-Fi price p f and optimize the VO's advertising price p a . We will show that the VO's optimal advertising price p * a is independent of p f . In the next subsection, we will further optimize p f .
Let Q (p a , p f ) denote the expected total number of sold ad spaces to all ADs. According to (11) , if p a > aγ, no AD will purchase the ad spaces and Q (p a , p f ) = 0; if 0 ≤ p a ≤ aγ, we compute Q (p a , p f ) as follows:
where M is the number of ADs, and 1 σmax is the probability density function for an AD's type σ.
We define Π VO a (p f , p a , δ) as the VO's expected advertising revenue, which can be computed as
where 1 − δ denotes the fraction of advertising revenue kept by the VO under the ad platform's policy. Based on (14), we formulate the VO's advertising pricing problem as follows. Problem 2. The VO determines the optimal advertising price by solving
where constraint (16) means that the VO can sell at most λN ϕ a (p f ) ad spaces as discussed in Section II-D.
The solution to Problem 2 is summarized in the following proposition (the proofs of all propositions can be found in the appendix).
Proposition 1 (Advertising price). The VO's unique optimal advertising price p * a is independent of the VO's Wi-Fi price p f and the ad platform's advertising revenue sharing policy δ, and is given by
We observe that the expression of p * a is sensitive to the number of ADs M and the parameter of ADs' popularity distribution σ max . To reduce the cases to be considered and have cleaner engineering insights, we will focus on a large advertising market asymptotics with the following assumption in the rest of the paper. 15 Assumption 1. There are infinitely many ADs in the advertising market, i.e., M → ∞, and the lowest popularity among all types of ADs is zero, i.e., σ max → ∞. , and 1) that we need to discuss (and we can solve), and we will not be able to include the full analysis here due to the space limit. The consideration of finite systems without Assumption 1 does not change the main results in the later sections. In reference [13] , the authors directly modeled and analyzed the advertising market with an infinite number of ADs. 16 From (2), when σmax → ∞, the popularity of a type-σmax AD is limσ max→∞ s (σmax) = limσ max→∞ γe −γσmax = 0.
We define p ∞ a as the VO's optimal advertising price under Assumption 1. According to Proposition 1, we conclude p ∞ a in the following proposition. 17 Proposition 2 (Advertising price under Assumption 1). Under Assumption 1, The VO's unique optimal advertising price p ∞ a is independent of the VO's Wi-Fi price p f and the ad platform's advertising revenue sharing policy δ, and is given by
where η lim M,σmax→∞ M σmax and takes a value in [0, ∞). Next we explain the physical meaning of η. Under Assumption 1, if we randomly pick an MU, the expected number of ADs that the MU likes is computed as
Hence, η describes the popularity of the ad market.
Next we discuss how the VO's advertising price p decreases with λ. This is because MUs' small demand rate λ leads to a limited number of ad spaces. When λ increases, the VO has more ad spaces to sell, and will decrease p ∞ a to attract more ADs. We can verify that the number of sold ad spaces is λN ϕ a (p f ), i.e., the VO always sells out all of the spaces. We call ADs that purchase the ad spaces as active ADs, and use ρ (p ∞ a ) to denote the expected number of active ADs. We can compute ρ (p
where σ T (p ∞ a ) is defined in (12) . Moreover, the VO's expected advertising revenue is
Both (21) and (22) increase with λ when λ is small.
2) Large λ ∈ 2η γ , ∞ : In this case, the advertising price p ∞ a is independent of λ. The reason is that the VO has sufficient ad spaces to sell, so it can directly set p ∞ a to maximize the objective function (15) while guaranteeing the capacity constraint (16) satisfied. We can verify that the number of sold ad spaces
, which is smaller than the capacity λN ϕ a (p f ).
18 Furthermore, the expected number of active ADs 17 In Section VIII, we show that even without Assumption 1, the p ∞ a derived in Proposition 2 is the optimal advertising price for most parameter settings. 18 In this case, the VO can fill the unsold ad spaces with other contents, e.g., its own business promotion, to guarantee the fairness among MUs choosing the advertising sponsored access. and the VO's expected advertising revenue is
Both (23) and (24) are independent of λ. Based on (22) and (24), we summarize the VO's expected advertising revenue as
where
B. VO's Optimal Wi-Fi Price
Now we analyze the VO's optimal choice of Wi-Fi pricing p f . We define Π VO f (p f ) as the VO's revenue in providing the premium access with a given p f . 19 Since there are N ϕ f (p f ) MUs choosing the premium access and the expected number of time segments demanded by an MU is λ, we have
Based on (25) and (27), we find that p f affects the VO's revenue in providing both types of access. The VO's total revenue is computed as
By checking ϕ f (p f ) and ϕ a (p f ) in (8), we can show that Π VO (p f , δ) does not change with p f when p f ∈ [βθ max , ∞). This is because all MUs will choose the advertising sponsored access if p f ≥ βθ max , and increasing p f in this range will no longer have an impact on Π VO (p f , δ). Therefore, we only need to consider optimizing Π VO (p f , δ) over p f ∈ [0, βθ max ]. This leads to the following optimal Wi-Fi pricing problem.
Problem 3. The VO determines the optimal Wi-Fi price to maximize its total revenue in (28):
Solving Problem 3, we obtain the VO's optimal Wi-Fi pricing in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Wi-Fi price under δ). Given the ad platform's fixed sharing policy δ, the VO's unique optimal WiFi price p * f (δ) is given by
We can show that p * f (δ) is non-increasing in δ. When δ increases, i.e., the fraction of advertising revenue left to the VO decreases, the VO decreases its Wi-Fi price p * f (δ) to attract more MUs to choose the premium access. 19 Notice that the VO's revenue in providing the premium access is collected from the MUs, and hence is independent of the VO's advertising price.
V. STAGE I: AD PLATFORM'S REVENUE SHARING
In this section, we study the ad platform's sharing policy δ in Stage I, considering the VO's pricing strategies in Stage II and MUs' and ADs' strategies in Stage III.
Based on the ad platform's sharing policy δ ∈ [0, 1 − ], the ad platform and the VO obtain δ and 1−δ fractions of the total advertising revenue, respectively. Since the VO's advertising revenue is given in (25), we compute the ad platform's revenue Π APL (δ) as
where p * f (δ) is the VO's optimal Wi-Fi price under policy δ, as computed in Proposition 3. We formulate the ad platform's optimization problem as follows.
Problem 4. The ad platform determines δ * to maximize its revenue in (32):
In order to compute the optimal δ * , we introduce an equilibrium indicator Ω, which affects the function form of δ * . We define Ω as
The intuition of Ω can be interpreted as follows. Based on (8) and (27), the VO's revenue in providing the premium access can be written as
Based on (25), the VO's revenue in providing the advertising sponsored access is
Next we focus on the system parameters in (36) and (37). We observe that the terms λβθ max N and ag (λ, γ, η) N act as the coefficients for (36) and (37), respectively. Therefore, intuitively, the indicator Ω in (35) describes the VO's relative benefit in providing the premium access over the advertising sponsored access. Based on the indicator Ω, we summarize the solution to Problem 4 as follows.
Proposition 4 (Revenue sharing policy). The ad platform's unique optimal advertising revenue sharing policy δ * is given by
We can see that δ * ≥ 2 3 for all Ω ∈ (0, ∞). That is to say, the ad platform always takes away at least two thirds of the total advertising revenue. In particular, when Ω ∈ (0, ] or Ω ∈ [1 − 2 , ∞), the ad platform chooses the highest sharing ratio, i.e., δ * = 1 − . Based on our early discussion of Ω, the VO's relative benefits in providing the premium access over the advertising sponsored access under these cases are either very small or very large. Therefore, even if the ad platform decreases its sharing ratio δ * , the VO's interest in providing the advertising sponsored access will not significantly increase in these two cases. As a result, the ad platform chooses the highest sharing ratio δ * to extract most of the advertising revenue.
Based on Proposition 4, we obtain the VO's Wi-Fi price at the equilibrium by plugging δ * into the expression of p * f (δ) in (31), and summarize it in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Wi-Fi price at the equilibrium). The VO's unique Wi-Fi price at the equilibrium is given by
According to (8) and Proposition 5, we can compute ϕ a p * f (δ * ) , i.e., the proportion of MUs choosing the advertising sponsored access at the equilibrium. We can show that ϕ a p *
for all Ω ∈ (0, ∞). Hence, at least half of the MUs choose the advertising sponsored access. In particular, when Ω ∈ 0,
i.e., all MUs choose the advertising sponsored access. In this case, the VO has a very small relative benefit in providing the premium access, and hence it charges the highest Wi-Fi price p * f (δ * ) = βθ max to push all MUs to choose the advertising sponsored access. 20 
VI. SOCIAL WELFARE ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the social welfare (SW) of the whole system at the equilibrium, which consists of the ad platform's revenue, the VO's total revenue, the MUs' total payoff, and the ADs' total payoff. The social welfare analysis is important for understanding how much the entire system benefits from the Wi-Fi monetization framework, and how it is affected by different system parameters. Specifically, we compute SW as:
Here, (i) the first term is the ad platform's revenue at the equilibrium, where Π APL (δ) is given in (32) and δ * is given in Proposition 4; (ii) the second term is the VO's total revenue at the equilibrium, where Π VO (p f , δ) is given in (28) and p * f (δ * ) is given in Proposition 5; (iii) the third term is the MUs' total payoff at the equilibrium, where Π MU (θ, d) is a 20 We would like to emphasize that in order to derive clean engineering insights, our model unavoidably involves some simplifications of the much more complicated reality. It is hence most useful to focus on the engineering insights behind the results such as δ * ≥ 2 3 and ϕa p * f (δ * ) ≥ literally.
type-θ MU's payoff for one time segment given in (1) and d * (θ, p f ) is given in (7); (iv) the last term is the ADs' total payoff at the equilibrium, where Π AD (σ, m) is given in (6), m * (σ, p a , p f ) is given in (11) , and p ∞ a is given in Proposition 2.
Note that the ADs' payments for displaying advertisements are transferred to the ad platform and the VO, and the MUs' payments for the premium access are collected by the VO. Therefore, these payments cancel out in (40). As a result, SW equals the total utility of all MUs and ADs. We show the value of SW in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Social welfare). The social welfare at the equilibrium is
where p * f (δ * ) and p ∞ a are the VO's Wi-Fi price given in Proposition 5 and the VO's advertising price given in Proposition 2, respectively.
In (41), the first two terms correspond to the total utility of MUs, and the last term corresponds to the total utility of ADs. In Section VIII-E, we will investigate the impacts of parameters γ and λ on the social welfare through simulation. The simulation results show that the social welfare is always non-decreasing in γ, and is increasing in λ for most parameter settings.
VII. IMPACT OF SYSTEM PARAMETERS
To understand the Wi-Fi monetization at venues with different features, we analyze the impacts of the advertising concentration level γ and visiting frequency λ on the equilibrium outcomes. Compared with other parameters, these two parameters can be dramatically different across venues and hence better reflect the features of the venues. Proposition 7 (Advertising concentration level γ). We conclude the following results regarding the influence of γ:
(i) The VO's advertising price p ∞ a in (19) is increasing in γ;
(ii) The expected number of active ADs ρ (p (iv) The proportion of MUs that choose the premium access
Items (i) and (ii) of Proposition 7 describe the advertising sponsored access. A high concentration level γ implies that the ADs with small σ have much higher popularities than other ADs. Hence, when γ increases, the ADs with small σ have larger demand in displaying their advertisements. As a result, the VO increases p ∞ a to obtain more advertising revenue. On the other hand, the ADs with large σ have smaller demand in advertising, so the expected number of active ADs decreases. Items (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 7 describe the premium access. A larger γ corresponds to a smaller equilibrium indicator Ω. Based on the previous discussion in Section V, this means providing the advertising sponsored access is more beneficial to the VO. Hence, under a larger γ, the VO charges a higher p * f (δ * ) to push MUs to choose the advertising sponsored access, which reduces the proportion of MUs choosing the premium access.
Proposition 8 (Visiting frequency λ).
We conclude the following results regarding the influence of λ:
Items (i) and (ii) of Proposition 8 are related to the advertising sponsored access. According to the discussion in Section IV, a larger λ means the VO has more ad spaces to sell. Hence, when λ is larger, the VO chooses a smaller p ∞ a to attract more ADs.
Items (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 8 are related to the premium access. We can show that the equilibrium indicator Ω increases with λ. Based on the previous discussion in Section V, a larger indicator means providing the premium access is more beneficial to the VO. Therefore, with a larger λ, the VO charges a lower p * f (δ * ) to attract MUs to choose the premium access, which increases the proportion of MUs choosing the premium access.
According to Propositions 7 and 8, we can observe that parameters γ and λ have exactly the opposite impacts on the equilibrium outcomes.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results. First, we study the optimality of advertising price p ∞ a in (19) without Assumption 1. Then we compare the ad platform's revenue, the VO's revenue, the ADs' payoffs, and the social welfare at venues with different values of γ and λ. Finally, since the ad platform may set a uniform sharing policy for multiple VOs in the practical implementation due to the fairness consideration, we investigate the uniform revenue sharing case and compare it with the VO-specific revenue sharing case studied above. (19) is the optimal solution of Problem 2, assuming both M and σ max going to ∞ (Assumption 1). Now we numerically demonstrate that price p ∞ a computed based on (19) is optimal to Problem 2 even for most finite values of M and σ max as well.
A. Optimality of
We
, and a ∼ U [1, 3] , where U denotes the uniform distribution. We change M and σ max from 1 to 15. For each (M, σ max )-pair, we compute p ∞ a by (19) , and check whether it also optimally solves Problem 2. 21 We run the experiment 10, 000 times for each (M, σ max )-pair.
In Fig. 5 , we plot the percentage of times that p ∞ a is the optimal solution to Problem 2. We observe that the percentage increases with both M and σ max . Furthermore, when M, σ max ≥ 6, the percentage is always above 99%. Hence, we summarize the following observation. Next we compare the ad platform's revenue sharing policy and revenue for venues with different values of advertising concentration level γ and MU visiting frequency λ. We choose N = 200, θ max = 1, β = 0.1, η = 1, a = 4, and = 0.01. We will apply the same settings for the remaining simulations in Section VIII. Fig. 6 is a contour plot illustrating the ad platform's revenue sharing ratio. The horizontal axis corresponds to parameter γ, and the vertical axis corresponds to parameter λ. The values on the contour curves are the ad platform's revenue sharing 21 Recall that for p ∞ a in (19) , parameter η is defined as lim M,σmax→∞ M σmax . Now we simply choose η = M σmax to compute p ∞ a for the finite M and σmax situation. In Proposition 1 we have derived the optimal p * a to Problem 2. To verify the optimality of p ∞ a , we just need to check whether p ∞ a equals p * a . ratios, δ * , computed for venues with different (γ, λ) pairs. The ad platform needs to strike a proper balance when choosing δ to maximize its revenue: (a) reduce δ can motivate the VO to push more MUs towards the advertising sponsored access, at the expense of a smaller ad platform's revenue per ad display; (b) increase δ can improve the ad platform's revenue per ad display, at the expense of making the advertising sponsored access less attractive to the VO. In Fig. 6 , the revenue sharing ratio δ * first decreases with λ, then increases with λ, which means approach (a) is more effective when λ is small and approach (b) is more effective when λ is large. This is because a large λ leads to a large indicator Ω, which means that the VO prefers the premium access, even if the ad platform leaves a large proportion of the advertising revenue to the VO. Hence, when λ is large, it is optimal for the ad platform to set a large δ * to take a large fraction of the advertising revenue from the VO. Fig. 7 is a contour plot illustrating the ad platform's revenue. We observe that the ad platform obtains a large Π APL from the venue when γ is large (γ > 0.9) and λ is small (1.2 < λ < 1.8). This parameter combination corresponds to a venue with a small equilibrium indicator Ω. According to Proposition 5, in this case, the VO chooses the highest Wi-Fi price, i.e., p * f (δ * ) = βθ max , and hence all MUs choose the advertising sponsored access. As a result, the total advertising revenue is large. Furthermore, based on Fig. 6 , the ad platform sets a large sharing ratio (δ * > 0.8) in this case to extract most of the advertising revenue.
We summarize the observations in Fig. 6 and 7 as follows.
Observation 2. The ad platform's optimal revenue sharing ratio δ * first decreases and then increases with λ. Furthermore, it obtains a large Π APL at the venue with both a large γ and a small λ. C. VO's Revenue with Different (γ, λ)
We investigate the VO's revenue from the advertising sponsored access Π at venues with different (γ, λ) pairs.
In Fig. 8 , we show the contour plot of Π VO a . We observe that a VO with γ > 0.4 and 3.5 < λ < 3.7 has a large Π VO a . Based on (25) and Proposition 5, the total advertising revenue at the equilibrium is aN ϕ a p * f (δ * ) g (λ, γ, η). From Proposition 7 (iv) and (26), we can show that both ϕ a p *
and g (λ, γ, η) are non-decreasing in γ. Therefore, the total advertising revenue at the equilibrium is non-decreasing in γ. Moreover, from Fig. 6 , the ad platform chooses a relatively small δ * (i.e., δ * < 0.7) at the venue with γ > 0.4 and 3.5 < λ < 3.7, and hence the VO obtains a large proportion of the total advertising revenue.
In Fig. 9 , we show the contour plot of Π VO f . We find that Π VO f is non-decreasing in λ. The reasons are twofold. First, as λ increases, the MUs visit the venue more frequently, and the expected number of time segments requested by the MUs increases. Second, according to Proposition 8 (iv), the proportion of MUs choosing the premium access is nondecreasing in λ.
In Fig. 10 , we show the contour plot of Π VO , which is the summation of Π VO a in Fig. 8 and Π VO f in Fig. 9 . We find that the VO with both a large γ (γ > 0.4) and a medium λ (3.5 < λ < 3.9) and the VO with a large λ have large Π VO . According to Fig. 8 , the former VO mainly generates its revenue from the advertising sponsored access. According to Fig. 9 , the latter VO mainly generates its revenue from the premium access.
We summarize the key observations in Fig. 8, 9 , and 10 as follows.
Observation 3. The VO with both a large γ and a medium λ has a large total revenue, which is mainly generated from the advertising sponsored access. The VO with a large λ also has a large total revenue, which is mainly generated from the premium access.
D. ADs' Payoffs with Different (γ, λ)
We investigate the ADs' payoffs at venues with different (γ, λ) pairs. In Fig. 11 , we plot the ADs' payoffs Π AD against the AD type σ under different values of γ and λ. We can observe that the ADs with higher popularities (i.e., smaller σ) have higher payoffs. When comparing curves with the same λ = 1 and different values of γ (0.5 and 1), we find that the increase of the concentration level γ makes ADs with small values of σ even more popular, and hence increases their payoffs. ADs with large values of σ will have smaller payoffs accordingly. When comparing curves with the same γ = 0.5 and different values of λ (1, 4, and 7), we observe that ADs' payoffs first increase and then decrease with λ. According to (6) , the increase of visiting frequency λ affects Π AD in two aspects: (a) from (19) , the advertising price p ∞ a becomes cheaper, which encourages the ADs to buy more advertising spaces and hence potentially increases Π AD ; (b) the VO decreases the Wi-Fi price p * f (δ * ) to attract MUs to the premium access, hence the proportion of MUs choosing the advertising sponsored access, i.e., ϕ a p * f (δ * ) , becomes smaller, which potentially decreases Π AD . In Fig. 11 , impact (a) dominates when λ increases from 1 to 4, and impact (b) dominates when λ increases from 4 to 7.
We summarize the key observation in Fig. 11 as follows.
Observation 4. ADs obtain large payoffs Π AD at the venue with a medium λ, and their payoffs decrease with the index σ.
E. Social Welfare with Different (γ, λ)
We study the impacts of parameters γ and λ on the social welfare, and show the contour plot of the social welfare in Fig. 12 .
First, we observe that the social welfare is non-decreasing in the advertising concentration level γ. From (41), we can prove that the social welfare is independent of γ for γ ≥ 2η λ , which is consistent with the observation here.
Second, we discuss the influence of the MU visiting frequency λ. According to (41), the increase of parameter λ has the following three impacts on the social welfare. First, each MU requires more time segments for the Wi-Fi connection, which increases the MUs' total utility. Second, as shown in Proposition 8 (iv), more MUs choose the premium access. In this case, less MUs need to watch the advertisements (i.e., ϕ a p * f (δ * ) decreases), which increases the MUs' total utility. Third, since more MUs choose the premium access instead of the advertising sponsored access, the ADs' total utility decreases. For most parameter settings, the first two impacts play the dominant roles. In Fig. 12 , we can observe that the social welfare always increases with λ. However, under a few extreme parameter settings (e.g., large unit advertising profit a and utility reduction factor β), the third impact plays the dominant role, and the social welfare may decrease with λ for some medium λ. We provide a related example in our technical report [19] . We summarize the key observation in Fig. 12 as follows.
Observation 5. The social welfare is always non-decreasing in γ. Moreover, the social welfare is increasing in λ for most parameter settings.
F. Uniform Advertising Revenue Sharing Policy δ U
In Section II-A, we assumed that the ad platform can set different advertising revenue sharing ratios for different VOs. This, however, may not be desirable in practice due to the fairness consideration. In Fig. 13 , we consider a more practical case, where the ad platform chooses a uniform advertising revenue sharing ratio δ U ∈ [0, 1 − ] for all VOs.
We assume that VOs have uniformly distributed γ and
, and are identical in other parameters. We formulate the ad platform's problem as follows. Problem 5. The ad platform decides δ * U by solving
where p * f (δ U ) is the VO's optimal Wi-Fi pricing response under revenue sharing ratio δ U , and is given in (31).
We consider 10, 000 VOs. By solving Problem 5 numerically, we obtain the optimal δ * U = 0.81. Fig. 13 is a contour figure illustrating the VO's total revenue Π VO with different values of γ and λ under δ * U = 0.81. 23 Next we compare the results in Fig. 13 (the uniform revenue sharing case) with those in Fig. 10 (the VO-specific revenue sharing case).
First, we find that the VO's total revenue in Fig. 13 always increases with λ, while the VO's total revenue in Fig. 10 decreases with λ in some cases (e.g., when γ > 0.4 and 3.9 < λ < 5.6). This is because a larger λ implies that the MUs request more time segments of Wi-Fi connection and there are more advertising spaces. In the uniform revenue sharing case, the ad platform chooses the same sharing ratio, δ * U , for all venues. Hence, in Fig. 13 , the VO's total revenue always increases with λ. In the VO-specific revenue sharing case, the ad platform's sharing ratio δ * increases with λ for some λ (as shown in Fig. 6 ). In this situation, the proportion of advertising revenue kept by the VO decreases with λ, and hence the VO's total revenue in Fig. 10 may decrease with λ. 22 We obtain the objective function in (42) by taking the expectation of the ad platform's revenue Π APL (δ) in (32) with respect to γ and λ. 23 Here, we only show the impact of δ * U on the VO's revenue. This is because it is obvious that the ad platform's revenue under δ * U = 0.81 is not greater than its revenue under δ * in the VO-specific revenue sharing case. Furthermore, as concluded in Section IV-A, the advertising price is independent of the ad platform's sharing policy. Therefore, the uniform advertising revenue sharing policy does not affect the ADs' payoffs.
Second, a VO with a medium λ in Fig. 13 has a smaller total revenue than that in Fig. 10 . Moreover, a VO with a large λ in Fig. 13 has a larger total revenue than that in Fig. 10 . These are consistent with the comparison between δ * U here (the uniform revenue sharing case) and δ * in Fig. 6 (the VOspecific revenue sharing case). For those VOs with δ * U > δ * , they obtain smaller proportions of the advertising revenue in the uniform revenue sharing case, so their revenues decrease. Otherwise, they obtain larger proportions of the advertising revenue in the uniform revenue sharing case, which increases their revenue.
We summarize the key observations in Fig. 13 as follows.
Observation 6. The VO's revenue under the uniform revenue sharing policy increases with λ. Compared with the VOspecific revenue sharing policy, the uniform revenue sharing policy increases the revenue of the VO with a large λ, and decreases the revenue of the VO with a medium λ.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied the public Wi-Fi monetization problem, and analyzed the economic interactions among the ad platform, VOs, MUs, and ADs through a three-stage Stackelberg game. Our analysis led to several important observations: (a) the ad platform's advertising revenue sharing policy affects a VO's Wi-Fi price but not the VO's advertising price; (b) the advertising concentration level γ and the MU visiting frequency λ have the opposite impacts on equilibrium outcomes; (c) the ad platform obtains a large revenue at the venue with both a large γ and a small λ; and (d) the VO with both a large concentration level and a medium MU visiting frequency and the VO with a large MU visiting frequency obtain large revenues.
In our future work, we plan to relax the assumptions of the uniformly distributed MU types and AD types, and also consider the MUs and ADs with multi-dimensional heterogeneity. For example, the MUs can have heterogeneous utility reduction factors β, besides the heterogeneous Wi-Fi access valuations θ. The ADs can have heterogeneous unit advertising profits a, besides the heterogeneous popularity indexes σ. According to [20] , the optimal pricing problem for the multidimensional heterogeneous buyers is generally much more challenging than that for the single-dimensional heterogeneous buyers. We are also interested in considering multiple ad platforms, who compete to attract the VOs through adjusting their advertising revenue sharing policies. 
By using the assumption > σ max , we have the following relation:
In Case A, we have the relation 
This contradicts with constraint (16) in Problem 2. Therefore, we have proved that Since ∈ 0,
